Information operations provide opportunities to avoid direct contact with superior conventional forces and threat capabilities enhanced where qualitative gaps with opposing forces exist. The theoretical framework for the study is a model of information warfare that draws a distinction between "cyberwar" and "netwar," two components of information warfare that are structurally different. Using a hybrid of this model, the effectiveness of threat strategy using "netwar" to disrupt the decision-making process and create paralysis at the strategic and operational level can be determined.
Introduction
The nature of warfare has changed dramatically since the end of the Cold War.
Conventional forces that are smaller, more agile, and possess greater lethality characterize the battlefield today. Post-industrial age technology allows states to project force globally in a short amount of time. Images of modern conflict portray military forces gaining relative advantage on the battlefield through dominant maneuver supported by information superiority and precision strikes at enemy centers of gravity.
The Desert Storm victory validated the emergence of a technologically superior United
States military as the dominant post-modern state combatant. Further validated was the notion that knowledge-based warfare will define the spectrum of conflict for the next century and that information-based operations are decisive factors in modern military operations. Current lexicon describes this as a "revolution in military affairs" or RMA. Yet, as with all revolutions in warfare, history suggests that adaptive threat strategies will occur to counter dominant military capabilities.
It is vital to U.S. national interests to understand how the threat is adapting to knowledgebased warfare and U.S. military information dominance. What methods are state and non-state actors using to counter U.S. technological superiority? Can adaptive threat applications be developed that cause strategic and operational paralysis? If so, then are they successful in achieving threat end-states and are they designed to use information operations to gain a relative advantage? Can it be shown that future threats to the security of the United States can develop new ways, specifically "netwar" strategies, to attack and exploit U.S. military weaknesses?
Methodology and Research Design
A conceptual template will be established herein to describe conflict in the next century.
The starting point for this discussion is the theoretical work of Samuel P. Huntington The discussion will also confirm that, despite U.S. military dominance, American civilian and military decision-making apparatus are vulnerable to a range of information generated threats. Our opponents recognize that without adapting to counter the information and technological superiority of U.S. forces, winning on the battlefield is a remote possibility. The start point for understanding threat adaptation is to look at how the U.S. military is transforming its force for the future, specifically through the application of information technologies and doctrinal changes addressing the use of information operations to wage information warfare.
Drawing a distinction between "cyberwar" and "netwar" is critical to understanding how the enemy is adapting to the use of militarily superior forces across the spectrum of conflict. The focus is to validate that netwar as an adaptive measure, is capable of creating strategic and operational paralysis. A specific set of enablers that includes the use of off-the-shelf technologies such as communication, low cost computing technologies, the use of perception management, and access to western media sources and transnational actors enhance the ability of threat organizations to cause significant damage to western institutions.
By nature western democratic institutions are more vulnerable to netwar attacks because of open access to institutional structures and information. In many ways, the strength of western society is also a significant weakness in the information age. To demonstrate how netwar strategy is used, recent conflicts in Somalia, Kosovo, and the Zapatista insurrection in Mexico will be examined. Threat adaptation using netwar concepts in all three cases countered opponents possessing superior military capabilities, creating a stalemate that preserved the institutional structure of each threat group.
Further discussion will assess how effective threat organizations are in achieving their objectives. Each case study mentioned in the preceding paragraph yields a unique outcome. It will be shown that netwar is used in various configurations designed to achieve a specific end-state, and that adaptation identifies threat organizations as learning organizations.
The final chapter will determine if the evidence and analysis presented supports the notion that adapting enemies represent a significant threat in the future. Is the trend for the next century of warfare centered on the innovative use of information and technology to construct a netwar capability to counter the application of U.S. and allied military power? If the assumption that adaptive threat strategies are a significant danger to military operations and create strategic and operational paralysis, then perhaps planning and organizational doctrine for future operations will require modification.
A Conceptual Framework for Future Conflict
The fundamental nature of war remains unchanged despite centuries of technological and tactical innovation. Clausewitz correctly warned that war… "is not the action of a living force upon a lifeless mass (total nonresistance would be no war at all), but always the collision of two living forces."
1 It is a highly complex interactive system characterized by friction, unpredictability, disorder, and fluidity, and not a mechanistic system subject to precise, positive control or synchronized schemes. 2 War remains an inherently human endeavor. However, how wars are waged and the dynamic environment in which they exist continues to change. The 21 st Century is no exception when attempting to predict how change will effect what the next war will look like or where and against whom it will be fought. Since the end of the Cold War a significant number of theories have emerged concerning future warfare. Samuel
Huntington suggests future conflict will consist of civilizations pitted against each other, and concludes, "most important conflicts of the future will occur along cultural fault lines separating civilizations."
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In contrast, Alvin and Heidi Toffler argue that three distinct divisions (waves) of society exist in the world today and that as we move from one wave to the next the potential grows for increasing regularity and intensity of conflict. 4 The transition from agrarian-based to industrial and then to information-based structures creates a shock-effect that resonates across societal boundaries. Conflict between waveforms is the norm because of the shifting of power and wealth.
A third viewpoint from Robert Kaplan suggests that the future international environment will mirror that of anarchy. Kaplan bases his theory on the premise that many nation-states are descending into a state of anarchy and becoming ungovernable. 5 Regional disputes tend to occur over access to natural resources and the delineation of geographical, cultural and racial boundaries. Conflict is a contest between the societies that have wealth and power and those that do not, and there is the potential for these conflicts to spread beyond regional confines.
The viewpoints of Kaplan, Huntington, and the Tofflers provide a benchmark for understanding the structure of the post-Cold War environment and the events that shape how it will look in the future. Each theory is relevant to explaining the appearance of new threats that were previously held in check by the bipolar international order of the last half of the 20 th Century.
3 Samuel P. The trend is that developed states, primarily Western nations, no longer dominate the international environment. What emerges is a global construct consisting of three tiers: mature states that possess fully developed economic, political, and social institutions; transitional states that are in the process of developing competing institutional structures; and a collective of failed states that rely on humanitarian and peacekeeping assistance from the developed nations.
Each tier of the global system has states and non-state groups with varying degrees of military capabilities that may pose a potential threat to U.S. national interests and to the interests of our allies. Further complicating the problem is the appearance of institutions that are not organized along the traditional hierarchical lines of nation-state actors but retain some degree of capability to counter the projection of Western political, economic, and military power.
Regardless of whether the U.S. and her allies are dominant global military powers, the emerging security environment is characterized more by ethnic conflict, states seeking to achieve regional hegemony, and a variety of networked sub-state and non-state actors such as terrorists, separatists, and international criminal organizations. Nation-states such as the U.S. will certainly remain the primary actors in the post-Cold War world, and states such as China, Iraq, and North Korea will continue to threaten regional stability and U.S. interests. However, destabilizing sub-state and transnational actors that demand increased levels of attention to mitigate the effects of regional conflict, fragmentation, and societal change will mark the new "bifurcated international environment."
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The challenge in the future for the U.S. and most of the developed world is how to respond to a bifurcated international environment and the potential for destabilization where U.S. and allied interests are at stake. The average American has already had a glimpse of what may be on the horizon. U.S. military power continues to be the instrument of choice for ending violence 6 Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr. and Richard H. Shultz, Jr., The official vision of future war reflects the belief that "information superiority" will be the lifeblood of a postmodern military and the key to battlefield success. 11 To transform U.S.
military capability, the so-called RMA must focus on the development of improved information and command and control capabilities that significantly enhance joint operations. 12 Theoretically, war will be waged by a "system of systems" connecting an array of space-based, ground-based, and air-based sensors that reduces or eliminates friction. Aided by decision-assistance technology, information superiority will enable U.S. commanders to strike enemy centers of gravity and decisive points with precision weapons at the right time.
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Joint Vision 2020 further expands the conceptual template for change by supporting the notion that transformation will yield a force that can achieve "full spectrum dominance" through the interdependent application of maneuver, precision engagement, focused logistics, and full dimensional protection. 14 Superior information and knowledge are the key enablers to maximize the four operational concepts listed above, implying that a shift is underway from traditional warfighting with its massed force and sequential operations towards warfighting that is focused on massed effects and simultaneous operations. concept of IO and the effective use of information to enhance military capabilities in the future are becoming dominant features of warfare. Although not new to warfare, information is one of the five elements of combat power, maneuver, firepower, leadership, protection, and information, driving the transition of U.S. and allied military forces from "industrial age warfare" to "information age warfare."
Before considering the impact of information operations within the spectrum of conflict, a conceptual framework for information warfare (IW) must be established. Field Manual (FM) 100-6, Information Operations defines information warfare as a range of actions taken during conflict to achieve information superiority over an adversary. 15 The Joint Staff more narrowly defines IW as actions that affect an opponent's information, information-based processes, information systems, and computer-based networks while protecting our own similar systems.
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The IO concept then becomes a component of information warfare and is a developed capability within the full range of military operations. IO is conducted by all forces prior to deployment and does not conclude until mission completion. As a battlefield operating system, IO is integrated both defensively and offensively to shape operations and provide opportunities for decisive actions. The real value of IO is measured by its effect on an opponent's ability to conduct military actions by denying critical information or disrupting his decision making process and operational tempo.
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How the commander uses IO to gain the advantage over an opponent is linked to a set of enablers that give him superior knowledge of the enemy and the battlefield in the form of "situational awareness" and "situational understanding. 
Network-centric Warfare
The information-age conflict spectrum must be defined to further understand how information is changing the face of war. John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, from the RAND Institute, offer insight by breaking information war into two subsets, "cyberwar" and "netwar."
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What is termed "cyberwar is important at the military end, where the focus is normally on highintensity conflict (HIC) and mid-intensity conflict (MRC), but 'netwar' will figure more prominent at the societal end, where the language is normally about low-intensity conflict (LIC)
18 Ibid., [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] problematic a mission becomes when networked threats use a combination of high-tech communications and low-tech strategies. Highly adaptable, networked threats thrive on dispersed operations using off-the-shelf technologies and decentralized command and control.
An archetypal netwar actor consists of a web (or network) of dispersed, interconnected "nodes" (or activity centers) -this is its key defining characteristic. 23 Each node may be built around a single entity, group, or fragments of groups in a formal or informal manner. There are no clear boundaries to a network and it may be loosely organized based on similar ideologies or interests. The organizational design parameters may be "all-channel," connected along a linear line of communication, or a central hub with supporting branches.
"All channel" networks are particularly difficult to counter because command and control nodes are not easily identified. Each node of the "all channel" network is designed to exist as a separate operating entity connected to all nodes within the network. Each node has the ability to work independently or together with other nodes given the specific nature of the mission.
Whatever the organization looks like, it retains the ability to conduct like operations or divide and operate as highly specialized components.
The principle strength of the networked organization is embedded in the command and control structures, which are relatively flat. Netwar doctrine is built around the application of power without cumbersome hierarchical command structures. The most effective nets often operate with little or no leadership, relying instead on decision-making that is decentralized and based on consensus. Although networked organizations are often referred to as cell-based and identified with terrorist groups, the presence of cells does not always mean the network exists or is of an "all-channel" design.
The most effective networks normally have a nonhierarchical design tied to a powerful ideology or doctrine spanning the entire network. Networked organizations with embedded 23 Ibid., 9.
ideologies and common objectives require little or no centralized command and control at the tactical level. Strategic and operational parameters set by ideology and doctrine establish direction for decision-making and execution at the lower levels.
However, the inherent weakness of the network design is a requirement for a well- Recognizing that the U.S. is without a military peer competitor, threat organizations seek to counter U.S. military dominance by creating conditions for stalemate. Attack is therefore, most likely to occur along a strategic axis with the goal of creating conditions for the strategic paralysis of the political decision-making process and operational paralysis of forces in the field. Recent operations in Kosovo, Somalia, Haiti, and Bosnia already indicate that uncertainty and problems with ethnic, cultural, and humanitarian issues complicate the decision-making process. Often the desire to see the issue through to the end dissolves because of the loss of public support, the impact of negative media content, and distributed threat psychological and deception operations that attack informational nodes, indirectly affecting command and control infrastructure. The threat understands that U.S. forces exist as a "system of systems" and that attacking the system enablers rather that the maneuver force is the best chance for success.
"Networked" organizations provide the greatest promise for less capable opponents to counter western military dominance. Using Arquilla and Ronfeldt's netwar model, the threat template changes dramatically. Assessing threat capabilities no longer becomes simply an exercise of locating the bulk of their forces and understanding their warfighting doctrine, but must also include an analysis of the political, economic, and societal organizations that influence how threat organizations fight.
New technologies make possible a "pure" variety of netwar in which all strategy and tactics -for example, disinformation campaigns and disruptive computer hacking -occur on "the internet" and in the media, but netwar also involves older technologies readily available at low cost to less developed states and non-state actors. 27 Though interaction among threat organizations is still driven by requirements for face-to face meetings, human couriers, and regular mail service, what has changed is the impact of technologies that allow less sophisticated opponents to coordinate, collect intelligence, and broadcast messages to target audiences.
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The move by states and non-state organizations away from direct confrontation with technologically superior military powers to network forms of warfare leverages the ability of transitional organizations not conforming to accepted norms of western-style democracy to achieve objectives based on their own terms. Because of globalization and the recognition that political, economic, and social institutions are more closely linked, opponents using netwar strategies have the ability to disrupt military forces by attacking non-military targets that impact on the decision making process.
Threat organizations also engage in similar planning cycles, identifying the "centers of gravity" and "decisive points" of the West, and developing strategies that focus on isolating critical nodes that will cause systemic collapse when disabled or destroyed. 29 In most cases,
because of the open nature of democratic governments and the impact of visual and print media on public opinion, ideal threat targets for "soft kill" or "non-lethal force" are the political leadership, belief systems, and economic infrastructures. Transportation and power grids also become key targets for computer generated attacks intended to paralyze command and control systems.
The real danger of netwar threat strategy is the network's ability to rapidly form and dissolve. It is possible that a threat network may organize as a kind of hybrid system when one node, such as a nation-state or governing organizations within a nation-sate, is connected to nodes that are transnational in nature with common strategic interests. The nation-state then may use transnational actors such as organized crime, non-governmental organizations, terrorists, or even contracted individuals to conduct discrete attacks against decision-making apparatus employing information technology, psychological warfare, or physical destruction.
Identifying its structure and then responding to how it executes operations makes the network difficult to counter. Networks are now defined more by "belief systems" than geographic boundaries and information technology allows them to organize rapidly, effectively, and dynamically. Consequently, targeting lines of communication and locating threat networks becomes difficult. To defeat threat networks, western militaries will have to mimic their operational capabilities, attacking networked organizations through networks.
Ironically, because the U.S. and the West depend heavily on the commercial sector to develop lead technologies, much of the latest technology is available off-the-shelf to potential opponents.
Western information technology may well provide non-Western threats solutions to two significant problems. First, cellular technology and the internet may allow them to remain engaged for long periods of time and maintain widely dispersed units. Second, the same technologies will allow them to rapidly mass when the opportunity arises for transition to the offense. Moreover, threat organizations are not hindered by the developmental costs associated with the acquisition of high technologies.
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This supports the notion that threat strategy for the next century will focus more on the disruption of institutions and military forces. The intent is to create stalemate and cause enough Western military casualties to pressure political leadership to opt-out of long term engagement, specifically in regional conflicts and intrastate war where U.S. and allied national interests and strategic objectives are not well defined.
One particular benefit of the information age for networked threats is the explosive growth of the internet and visual media technologies over the past decade. Both technologies provide a medium for conducting psychological warfare. China already recognizes the significant contribution of conducting psyop operations against an opponent.
The current emphasis is on peacetime psychological operations. These operations set the stage for using information warfare during times of conflict. Technological developments have made it possible to subject all people, from commoner to heads of state, to a complex information offensive. Information media, such as language, texts, images and sound, as future weapons, exert a "multilevel operational effect" instead of simply a political or economic one. The target remains the enemy's decision-making process, both human (the mind) and material (hardware data processing).
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The media conduits available to threat organizations provide opportunities for the conduct of psychological warfare against military and civilian organizations.
In a broader sense, the media is benefiting from the same technology that gives the U.S. shifted alliances among themselves, an inherent complexity of tribal society. 42 The understanding of how the clan systems were interconnected and functioned was necessary to dealing with what was perceived to be a state of anarchy.
The impact of clan infighting and the absence of any legitimate controlling government in Somalia alerted the attention of the U.S. and the rest of the world. American embassy workers had already been evacuated, but worsening conditions accentuated by the media and reports from non-governmental organizations (NGO) continued to have an impact and prompted U.S. policy makers to approve a military airlift of food and medicine to the beleaguered nation. 43 The crisis had remained largely beyond the purview of the international community until 1992, when disturbing images of massed starvation, lawlessness, and the diversion of critical relief supplies by armed banditry caused increased pressure in the West for more effective action to stabilize the conflict.
44
The ensuing operations co-sponsored by the U.S. and the United Nations (UNOSOM I and II) met with little success in achieving the goal of restoring a viable government and alleviating the deteriorating social conditions. Both U.N. operations were politically weak and pursued ad-hoc policies. The more powerful and larger U.S. led Unified Task Force (UNITAF) had the resources but insisted that its mandate was nonpolitical and limited to humanitarian relief operations.
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Complicating matters was the presence of a number of organizations in country for humanitarian purposes with divergent and conflicting agendas. Much of the information was transferred throughout the Somali network using cell phone technology and one-on-one contact with operatives working in U.S. and U.N. compounds.
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The third trend suggests that decision-making cycles are vulnerable to the spinning of information. The media impact and the erosion of public support after the death of American soldiers validates the notion that how information is received and processed significantly impacts on the decision-making process. representatives, networks that attack the decision cycle with disinformation or manipulated information realize success when the policy-making process becomes bogged down by indecision, or when consensus among the key players becomes fractured. In the case of Somalia, the conduct of the mission, the mission's effect on the political-military situation in Somalia and, later, the tension with the U.N. over the conduct of the operation, as well as by the interagency process, influenced the decision to continue humanitarian and peace enforcement operations.
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In summary, the failure and subsequent withdrawal from the Somali peacekeeping and humanitarian mission set the stage for future debate over the role of American peacekeeping forces. More importantly, opponents of the U.S. and her allies took away valuable lessons that would later be refined into an ad-hoc threat doctrine. Somalia became a victory not only for Somali clans, but also for state and non-state threats looking for alternative strategies to counter the application of U.S. military force to stabilize regional conflict.
Kosovo
The analysis of NATO's military action in Kosovo offers unique insight into adaptive threat strategies. The genesis of the conflict is rooted in ethnic and cultural tensions that have been pervasive throughout the Balkan region since the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. The problem that remains the central focus of the post-Cold War era is the synthesis of east-west conflict over independence and state formation that was also the source of conflict for much of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. NATO initially expected the bombing campaign to last only seven or eight days.
However, political advisors and military planners underestimated the resolve of President
Milosevic and the Serbian people and the air campaign stretched into a seventy-eight day operation.
Despite the presence of overwhelming military power, the early phases of the conflict were dominated by Serb actions in Kosovo. Up to 10,000 Kosovars died at Serb hands; thousands more were raped or otherwise brutalized, and some 800,000 more forcefully expelled from the province. Ultimately perhaps 1,000 to 2,000 Serbs perished; to include civilians killed by collateral damage and Serb forces on the battlefield. Although the air war over Serbia was the main focus, both sides also waged a media war.
Nightly broadcasts that addressed Allied progress and the attempt to accurately measure battle damage were turned into messages that NATO was defending the defenseless, yet Milosevic turned the same information against NATO by claiming that allied bombing was intentionally targeting the defenseless Serbian peoples. 63 For the most part, NATO was unprepared for the information war waged by Milosevic.
Another benefit to Milosevic of waging an information war was linked to buying time to continue the systematic extermination of ethnic Albanians in Kosovo. In fact, indicators suggest that the Serbian army, police, and paramilitary units murdered as many as 10,000 Kosovar
Albanians during the execution of Operation Allied Force. 64 Because force protection issues ruled out the use of ground troops from the operation and caused airstrikes to be restricted to highaltitudes, Serbian forces operated during hours of limited visibility with relative freedom to continue dispersed ethnic cleansing operations throughout the province.
A more disturbing trend is a continued focus on casualty aversion by U.S. political and military leadership. Major General Robert Scales, Jr. best articulates the preoccupation with casualty aversion.
Casualties soon may represent a dominant, perhaps the dominant measure of success or failure in wars of limited ends and means such as Operation Allied Force in Kosovo. Dead Americans are becoming our most vulnerable center of gravity -and our enemies know it. As we saw in Kosovo, serious doubts on the part of our national leaders about casualties may not only delay, but may well prevent commitment of ground forces.
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The key point that MG Scales makes is that casualty aversion has become a strategic center of gravity and that force protection issues before consideration of strategic and operational objectives drive decisions on the use of force in the future.
To summarize, Operation Allied Force exposed some fundamental truths about how the enemy is adapting to U.S. Unlike insurgencies of the past, the "social netwar" waged by the Zapatista's was directly linked to the ability of the EZLN and NGOs to form highly networked, transnational coalitions 
CHAPTER 4 Conclusion
Threat entities are adapting to successfully deal with the projection of superior military power. Based on the case histories cited, it can be concluded that threats to the security of the United States and her allies might achieve the operational and strategic paralysis of U.S. and allied military forces through "netwar strategies."
Several key assumptions about the new strategic environment must be articulated. First, the United States currently maintains status as the premier military power. No peer competitor exists or is likely to exist in the near future. Consequently, the U.S. capability to project power worldwide is a strength unmatched by any other developed nation-state. High technology is a hallmark of U.S. power projection, but brings with it significant vulnerabilities.
Second, despite our power projection capabilities and the envious position of being one of the wealthiest nations in the world, relationships among all states are weaker and more fluid due to the lack of a single monolithic threat. Third, the inherent drawback accompanying the transition from the industrial age to the information age is the perceived reduction of stability and predictability in the realm of domestic and international politics. Consequently, the potential for conflict internally and externally increases as more groups with similar interests seek autonomy or independence.
Fourth, because of globalization and the collapse of traditional Cold War structures, the potential for regional conflict is increasing. States that once were controlled by the Soviet Union have dissolved and are reorganizing along more ethnic and cultural lines. Persistent low-intensity conflict marked by intrastate warfare sets conditions for escalation to mid-intensity conflict which contributes to regional destabilization. The political complexity and intensity of intrastate warfare and the extensive impact of humanitarian disasters on civil society raise problems that defy the simple application of discriminate force as a tool for conflict resolution. The trend over the last decade is the expansion of military operations other than war (MOOTW) and the increased use of the military as a first choice response when confronted with complex humanitarian emergencies.
Finally, the rise of transnational actors as key players in the international environment becomes problematic for traditional nation states. Information age technologies act as catalysts for non-state organizations that seek to exercise power at the same level as developed nation states. Technology creates opportunities for hybrid forms of transnational actors to impact upon the decision-making process of more powerful states, in some cases causing them to readjust foreign policy in favor of minority organizations with specific agendas or a common set of goals.
Despite trends that suggest the international environment is undergoing significant change, the nation-state remains a significant player in international relations. Developed states such as the United States with robust political, economic, military, and social institutions will continue to lead the rest of the world into the next century. However, the pace at which change is occurring reflects the impact of the information revolution.
Interdependence among states has always existed, but is becoming more complex because of the availability of information. The small cost of transmitting messages and transferring data in near real-time across the globe increasingly provides opportunities for multiple social and political relationships to be formed, endowing non-state actors with enormous amounts of "soft-power" that influence or even paralyze the ability of states to engage in controversial international activities.
The changing environment and the information revolution also provides opportunities for new threats to arise. The leveling effect of the information revolution reduces the barriers of entry to threat states and organizations. The distributed and nondescript nature of the world-wide-web allows states and non-state actors with agendas that threaten regional stability to become more difficult to counter and assign accountability. Many of them recognize that direct confrontation with more powerful states, specifically states that possess strong military organizations, is not desired and seek alternative methods of warfare.
The emphasis on studying the impact of the information revolution has produced numerous theories about how war will be fought in the future. The emphasis herein has been on Arquilla and Ronfeldt's model of "netwar" developed at the RAND Institute. Studying netwar offers insight into how threat organizations are adapting to the more frequent use of conventional military power to terminate conflict on threat terms but short of total war.
The precise definition of netwar refers to the emerging mode of conflict at societal levels where threat organizations use network forms of organization along with related doctrines, strategies, and information-age technologies to achieve goals and objectives. What makes netwar dangerous to conventional militaries and state structures is the ability it affords threat actors to communicate and coordinate their activities across all global boundaries using information-age Although Milosevic's regime became a casualty of NATO airpower, the important lessons taken away from the conflict between Serbia and NATO are tied to how the threat adapted to the application of overwhelming military power. Milosevic sought to create a stalemate with NATO initially through diplomatic maneuver. However, once NATO resorted to the use of force, Serbian strategy shifted to deception tactics, specifically by hiding air defense assets. The objective was to buy time to allow the completion of the ethnic cleansing of Kosovo.
Simultaneously, Milosevic waged and information war against the U.S. and NATO. It could be argued that the information campaign achieved limited success initially, but could not sustain itself due to the lack of supporting networks. However, Serbian information warfare reinforces the inherent value and power of public opinion. The campaign also exposed the problem of targeting elements of threat infrastructure that support the transfer of information.
Physical destruction may not always be necessary, but it may have the potential to be detrimental to occupying forces since the future use of facilities may be critical to post-hostility operations.
The Zapatista insurrection has implications that extend beyond Mexico. Furthermore the linkages between the EZLN and transnational actors, establishes a prototypical model for the transformation of organizations that are significant threats to the U.S. and her allies. Examples include networked criminal organizations that continue to be a growing threat because of the ability to leverage global and regional connections. Although diverse in organization and ideology, they have the capability to operate freely across borders, remain mobile, and easily adapt to changing economic, political, and social conditions.
More importantly, organizations based on the Zapatista "social netwar" model create conditions where conventional peacekeeping and peace enforcement strategies do not always work. The failure to integrate influential NGOs networked with other civil-society actors that have robust organizational, technological, and social infrastructures into U.S. and allied military operations could significantly degrade operational capabilities.
The relevance of examining threat adaptation and the use of information warfare as an enabler is apparent. The information age is changing how combatants execute operations within the spectrum of conflict. The emphasis is on creating networked organizations with the influence to alter public opinion through the various forms of media. Additionally, building hybrid organizations capable of exploiting the strengths of each entity but flexible enough to disperse to avoid defeat with the intent to disrupt command and control nodes is how the threat is adapting to power projection by the U.S. and her allies.
The likely implications for the future are, first, the information revolution will continue to favor networked organizations with flat command and control structures. Second, highly automated and hierarchical systems such as the U.S. will become more vulnerable to disruption from directed informational flows that seek to overload sensors and collection assets. Networks will conduct netwar from various locations in an attempt to influence perceptions and shape public policy. Traditional organizational structures as found in the U.S. military will have a difficult time fighting networked threats because of the threat's ability to rapidly form and disperse as the situation warrants.
Finally, it takes networks to fight networks. The future may require new organizations that are a hybrid of military units and non-military organizations working in conjunction to locate and counter networked threats. Experience indicates that for states with structures and institutions similar to the U.S., defense against networked threats will require effective interagency operations. Capabilities will be determined by the skillful blending of hierarchical structures with that of decentralized operations. "Netwar" and "networks" will significantly impact on the ability of the U.S. to project power in the future. Being the best at mastering the network medium will ensure that relative advantage on the battlefield is achieved.
